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A	  ‘credible’	  response	  to	  persons	  fleeing	  armed	  conflict.	  
	  
James	  A.	  Sweeney*	  
	  In	  this	  short	  contribution	  I	  will	  address	  two	  key	  issues	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  plight	  of	  those	  who	  are	  fleeing	  armed	  conflict:	  firstly	  and	  more	  briefly,	  the	  UK’s	  reluctance	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  UN’s	  resettlement	  scheme	  for	  Syrian	  refugees;	  and	  secondly	  the	   role	   of	   ‘credibility’	   within	   the	   process	   of	   determining	   eligibility	   for	  international	  protection.	  	  These	  comments	  were	  originally	  compiled	  to	  stimulate	  discussion	  and	  to	  frame	  two	   further,	   longer,	   papers	   also	   presented	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Luxemburg	   in	  October	   2014	   by	   Blanche	   Tax,	   of	   the	   UNHCR;	   and	   by	   Serge	   Bodart,	   former	  President	   of	   the	   Council	   for	   Aliens	   Law	   Litigation	   (in	   Belgium).	   	   Those	  contributions	   appear	   elsewhere	   in	   this	   volume.	   	   My	   contribution	   has	   been	  updated	  modestly	  to	  reflect	  new	  guidance	   issued	  to	  asylum	  caseworkers	   in	  the	  UK,	  in	  January	  2015;	  and	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  UK	  general	  election	  in	  May	  2015.	  	  	  
The	  Resettlement	  of	  Syrian	  Refugees	  
	  The	  UK’s	  attempts	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  equivalence	  of	  humanitarian	  relief	  in	  the	  region	   around	   Syria,	   with	   refugee	   and	   subsidiary	   protection	   in	   the	   UK,	   are	  profoundly	  concerning.	  	  It	  is	  not	  that	  the	  UK	  is	  consciously	  failing	  to	  comply	  with	  its	   international	  and	  EU	  obligations,	  but	  rather	  that	  by	  even	  beginning	  to	  make	  the	   argument,	   the	   impression	   is	   given	   that	   international	  protection	  obligations	  upon	  the	  UK	  can	  be	  offset	  by	  foreign	  policy.	  	  As	  I	  have	  remarked	  in	  the	  media,	  the	  UK’s	  position	   is	  dangerous	  because	   it	   gives	   the	   impression	   that	   rich	   states	   can	  buy	  their	  way	  out	  of	  giving	  protection	  to	  refugees.1	  	  	  	  The	  root	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  UK	  has	  declined	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  UNHCR’s	  scheme	  for	  resettling	  vulnerable	  Syrian	  refugees.	  	  In	  January	  2014,	  UK	  Ministers	  were	  reported	  as	  stressing	  instead	  that	  the	  UK	  had	  given	  £500	  million	  in	  aid,	  and	  insisted	   that,	   ‘it	   [was]	   better	   to	   help	   the	   hundreds	   of	   thousands	   of	   refugees	  displaced	  around	  Syria's	  borders.’2	  	  The	  BBC’s	   James	  Landale	  reported	   that	   the	  UK	  government	  was	  ‘reluctant	  to	  admit	  any	  Syrian	  refugees	  to	  the	  UK,	  preferring	  to	  focus	  its	  humanitarian	  aid	  on	  refugees	  in	  the	  region’.3	  	  The	  humanitarian	  aid	   is	  both	  welcome	  and	  generous:	   	   but	   it	   is	  not	   a	   zero-­‐sum	  game:	  it	  does	  not	  wipe	  away	  protection	  needs.	   	  On	  the	  27th	  January	  2014	  these	  concerns	  were	  raised	  very	  vocally	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons,	  with	  MPs	  from	  all	  the	  political	  parties	  criticising	  the	  government	  for	  its	  lack	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  Professor	  of	  International	  Law,	  Lancaster	  University	  Law	  School	  (UK).	  1	  See,	  Jamie	  Merrill,	  ‘Labour	  fury	  at	  Government	  decision	  not	  to	  send	  minister	  to	  Syria	  summit’	  
Independent	  (London,	  4	  December	  2014)	  available	  at	  <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-­‐fury-­‐at-­‐government-­‐decision-­‐not-­‐to-­‐send-­‐minister-­‐to-­‐syria-­‐summit-­‐9904433.html>	  accessed	  11	  June	  2015.	  	  	  2	  BBC,	   ‘Syria:	   UK	  must	   accept	   refugees	   as	   “matter	   of	   humanity”’	   (BBC	  News,	   20	   January	   2014)	  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­‐politics-­‐25816108>	  accessed	  11	  June	  2015.	  3	  BBC,	  ‘UK	  to	  act	  with	  “urgency”	  over	  Syrian	  refugees	  says	  PM’	  (BBC	  News,	  29	  January	  2014)	  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­‐politics-­‐25934659>	  accessed	  11	  June	  2015.	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UNHCR	  scheme.4	  	  Two	  days	  later,	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  David	  Cameron,	  announced	  that	  the	  UK	  would	  be	  acting	  with	  ‘the	  greatest	  urgency’	  to	  offer	  ‘the	  most	  needy	  people’	   a	   home	   in	   the	   UK,5	  and	   Home	   Secretary	   Theresa	   May	   announced	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  ‘vulnerable	  person	  relocation	  scheme’.6	  	  It	  was,	  she	  clarified,	  ‘in	  the	  spirit	   of	   the	  UNHCR	  programme,	   but	   […]	  not	   technically	  part	   of	   it.’7	  	   The	   ‘VPR’	  scheme,	   as	   it	   is	   now	   known,	   would	   operate	   alongside	   two	   other	   resettlement	  schemes	   already	   in	   existence,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   regular	   mechanisms	   in	   place	   to	  determine	  eligibility	  for	  international	  protection.8	  	  It	   was	   then	   not	   until	   the	   25th	   March	   2014	   that	   the	   Immigration	   and	   Security	  Minister	   James	   Brokenshire	   announced	   that	   the	   first	   group	   of	   Syrians	   had	  arrived	   under	   the	   scheme.9	  	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   minister	   said	   that	   he	   had	  agreed	   a	  ministerial	   authorisation,	   ‘to	   allow	   differentiation	   in	   favour	   of	   Syrian	  nationals	  whom	  we	  want	  to	  bring	  to	  the	  UK	  under	  the	  VPR	  scheme.’	  	  	  	  The	  initiation	  of	  this	  policy	  was	  a	  very	  significant	  step.	  	  However,	  I	  remain	  struck	  by	   the	   language	   in	   the	   Minister’s	   statement	   that	   it	   is	   about	   people	   ‘whom	  we	  
want	  to	  bring	  to	  the	  UK’,	  because	  would	  seem	  to	  based	  on	  the	  UK’s	  wants	  rather	  than	  the	  refugees’	  needs;	  and	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  we	  ‘want’	  very	  few.	  	  By	   the	   24th	   June	   2014,	   a	   parliamentary	   question	   elicited	   the	   confirmation	   that	  just	  50	  people	  had	  been	  resettled	  in	  the	  UK	  under	  the	  scheme.10	  	  According	  to	  the	  latest	  figures,	  published	  in	  March	  2015,	  a	  total	  of	  187	  people	  have	  been	  relocated	  under	  the	  VPR	  scheme	  since	  it	  began.11	  	  	  	  To	   put	   this	   in	   perspective,	   as	   of	   June	   2015	   there	   are	   nearly	   1.2	   million	   UN-­‐refugees	  in	  Lebanon,12	  making	  up	  a	  quarter	  of	  that	  country's	  population.13	  	  When	  this	  paper	  was	  first	  delivered,	  the	  available	  data	  showed	  that	  there	  were	  around	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Ibid.	  5	  HC	  Deb	  29	  Jan	  2014,	  col	  851.	  6	  HC	  Deb	  29	  Jan	  2014,	  col	  863.	  7	  HC	  Deb	  29	  Jan	  2014,	  col	  866.	  8	  HC	  Deb	  29	  Jan	  2014,	  col	  864.	  9	  Home	  Office	  and	  James	  Brokenshire,	  Written	  statement	  to	  Parliament	  (25	  March	  2015)	  <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/vulnerable-­‐persons-­‐relocation-­‐scheme-­‐for-­‐syrian-­‐nationals>	  accessed	  11	  June	  2015.	  10	  UK	  Parliament,	  ‘Asylum:	  Syria:	  Written	  question	  –	  200675’	  (21	  March	  2015)	  <http://www.parliament.uk/written-­‐questions-­‐answers-­‐statements/written-­‐question/commons/2014-­‐06-­‐17/200675>	  accessed	  11	  June	  2015.	  11	  Home	  Office,	  ‘Immigration	  Statistics,	  January	  to	  March	  2015’,	  Section	  8.2	  (21	  May	  2015)	  <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-­‐statistics-­‐january-­‐to-­‐march-­‐2015/immigration-­‐statistics-­‐january-­‐to-­‐march-­‐2015>	  accessed	  11	  June	  2015.	  12	  UNHCR,	  ‘Syria	  Regional	  Refugee	  Response:	  Inter-­‐agency	  Information	  Sharing	  Portal’	  <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>	  accessed	  11	  June	  2015.	  13	  Harriet	  Sherwood,	  ‘UK	  has	  only	  let	  in	  24	  Syrian	  refugees	  under	  relocation	  scheme	  for	  conflict	  victims’,	  Guardian	  (London,	  20	  June	  2014)	  available	  at	  <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/20/uk-­‐24-­‐syrians-­‐vulnerable-­‐persons-­‐relocation-­‐scheme>	  accessed	  11	  June	  2015.	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760,000	  refugees	   in	  Turkey14	  -­‐	   this	  has	  now	  risen	   to	  a	   staggering	  1.7	  million,15	  making	  Turkey	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  refugee	  hosting	  country.16	  	  The	   lingering	   impression	   therefore	   is	   still	   that	   the	   UK	   is	   reluctant	   to	   do	  more	  than	  comply	  minimally	  with	  its	  international	  obligations,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  to	  leave	  hanging	  the	  implication	  that	  aid	  is	  a	  functional	  equivalent	  to	  protection.	  	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  UK	  has	  not	  changed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  2015	  general	  election,	  after	  which	  David	  Cameron	  remained	  Prime	  Minister,	  but	   this	  time	  with	  a	  majority	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  (the	  previous	  government	  was	  a	  coalition	  with	  the	  Liberal	  Democrat	  party).	  	  Theresa	  May	  has	  continued	  as	  Home	  Secretary,	  and	  on	  13th	  May	  2015	  made	  the	  following	  comments	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  UK’s	  refusal	  to	  participate	  in	  new	  EU	  measures	  to	  alleviate	  the	  fatal	  situation	  in	  the	  Mediterranean,	  People	  talk	  about	  refugees,	  but	  actually	   if	  you	   look	  at	   those	  crossing	  the	  central	   Mediterranean,	   the	   largest	   number	   of	   people	   are	   those	   from	  countries	   such	   as	   Nigeria,	   Somalia	   and	   Eritrea	   -­‐	   these	   are	   economic	  migrants	   and	   people	   who	   have	   paid	   criminal	   gangs	   to	   transport	   them	  across	  from	  Africa	  in	  non-­‐safe	  boats	  who	  then	  have	  to	  be	  rescued.17	  	  	  	  There	  is	  a	  crucial	  point	  missing	  from	  this	  familiar	  and	  dispiriting	  attempt	  to	  blur	  forced	   and	   voluntary	   migration:	   by	   April	   2015,	   the	   single	   largest	   group	  attempting	   to	   cross	   the	  Mediterranean	   in	   2015,	   comprising	   31%,	  were	   people	  from	  Syria.18	  	  Eritrea	  was	  second	  at	  18%,	  but	  Theresa	  May’s	  first	  two	  examples,	  Nigeria	  and	  Somalia,	  comprised	  only	  4%	  and	  3%	  respectively.19	  	  	  So,	  very	   few	  people	  have	  been	  resettled	  to	   the	  UK.	   	  Many	  people	  attempting	  to	  cross	  the	  Mediterranean	  sea	  to	  Europe	  have	  died	  en	  route,	  including	  more	  than	  1750	  from	  January	  to	  April	  2015	  alone.20	  	  However,	  if	  someone	  fleeing	  Syria	  does	  make	   it	   into	   the	   EU,	   then	   they	  may	   attempt	   to	  make	   a	   claim	   for	   international	  protection	  under	  the	  Common	  European	  Asylum	  System.21	  	  However,	  as	  we	  shall	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Ibid.	  15	  UNHCR	  (n12).	  	  16	  UNHCR,	  ‘Refugees	  endure	  worsening	  conditions	  as	  Syria's	  conflict	  enters	  5th	  year’	  (12	  March	  2015)	  <http://www.unhcr.org/5501506a6.html>	  accessed	  12	  June	  2015.	  17	  These	  comments	  were	  made	  on	  BBC	  Radio	  4,	  and	  were	  widely	  reported	  elsewhere	  including	  
inter	  alia	  Stephanie	  Linning,	  ‘Send	  home	  asylum	  seekers	  rescued	  from	  Mediterranean,	  says	  Theresa	  May	  as	  she	  insists	  EU	  plan	  for	  migrant	  quotas	  would	  only	  encourage	  them’,	  Mail	  Online	  (13	  May	  2015)	  <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-­‐3079303/Asylum-­‐seekers-­‐rescued-­‐Med-­‐sent-­‐home.html>	  accessed	  12	  June	  2015.	  18	  Raziye	  Akkoc	  et	  al,	  ‘Mediterranean	  migrant	  death	  toll	  '30	  times	  higher	  than	  last	  year':	  as	  it	  happened’,	  Telegraph	  (21	  April	  2015)	  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/11548995/Mediterranean-­‐migrant-­‐crisis-­‐hits-­‐Italy-­‐as-­‐EU-­‐ministers-­‐meet-­‐live.html>	  accessed	  11	  June	  2015.	  	  This	  point	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  data	  from	  Frontex,	  which	  has	  also	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  Syrians	  and	  Eritreans	  were	  the	  top	  two	  nationalities	  attempting	  to	  cross	  the	  Mediterranean.	  	  See	  e.g.	  Frontex,	  ‘Central	  Mediterranean	  Route’	  <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-­‐and-­‐routes/central-­‐mediterranean-­‐route/>	  accessed	  12	  June	  2015.	  19	  Akkoc	  et	  al	  (n18).	  20	  Akkoc	  et	  al	  (n18).	  21	  Basic	  information	  can	  be	  found	  at	  European	  Commission,	  ‘Common	  European	  Asylum	  System’	  <	  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-­‐affairs/what-­‐we-­‐do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm>	  accessed	  12	  June	  2015.	  	  See	  also	  Olga	  Ferguson	  Sidorenko,	  The	  Common	  European	  Asylum	  System	  -­‐	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see	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   it	   can	   be	   very	   difficult	   indeed	   to	   persuade	   decision	  makers	  that	  the	  need	  for	  international	  protection	  is	  ‘credible’.	  	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  paper	  I	  shall	  examine	  the	  idea	  of	  credibility,	  in	  particular	  by	  reference	  to	  recent	  developments	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  
Credibility22	  	  The	  Common	  European	  Asylum	  system	  offers	   subsidiary	  protection	   for	   certain	  people	   who	   are	   fleeing	   from	   situations	   of	   international	   or	   internal	   armed	  conflict.23	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	  those	  who	  are	  fleeing	  the	  conflict	  in	  Syria.	  	  	  According	  to	  Article	  2(e)	  of	  the	  EU	  Qualification	  Directive	  (EU	  QD)	  there	  must	  be	  ‘substantial	   grounds’	   for	   believing	   that	   the	   person	   would	   face	   a	   ‘real	   risk’	   of	  suffering	  ‘serious	  harm’.24	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  legal	  test,	  and	  it	  sets	  a	  clear	  (low)	  standard	  of	  proof.	   	  However,	  at	   least	   in	   the	  UK,	   there	   is	  a	   tendency	  to	  consider	  the	   ‘believability’	   of	   claimed	  material	   facts	   by	   reference	   to	   ‘credibility’	   before,	  and	   indeed	   almost	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of,	   consideration	   of	   real	   risk.	   	   The	  phenomenon	  also	  arises	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  determination	  of	  refugee	  status.	  	  There	  are	  two	  very	  real	  problems	  with	  this	  approach,	  and	  sadly	  the	  one	  amplifies	  the	  other.	  	  The	   first	   is	   that	   the	   quality	   of	   credibility	   assessments	   is	   very	   poor	   (across	  Europe).	   	   The	   second	   is	   that	   the	   precise	   legal	   role	   of	   credibility	   is	   frequently	  misunderstood,	   leading	   to	   an	   impressionistic	   resolution	   of	   the	   case	   without	  proper	   consideration	   of	   the	   risk	   element.	   	   The	   whole	   case	   then	   centres	   upon	  credibility	  and,	   in	  particular,	   the	   ‘general	  credibility’	  of	   the	  applicant.	   	  The	  next	  section	   will	   examine	   the	   quality	   of	   credibility	   assessments,	   and	   then	   we	   shall	  examine	   the	   legal	   nature	   of	   ‘credibility’	   and	   its	   relationship	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  ‘benefit	  of	  the	  doubt’	  in	  applications	  for	  international	  protection.	  	  
Quality	  of	  credibility	  assessments	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Background,	  Current	  State	  of	  Affairs,	  Future	  Direction	  (TMC	  Asser	  2007);	  Samantha	  Velluti,	  
Reforming	  the	  Common	  European	  Asylum	  System	  —	  Legislative	  developments	  and	  judicial	  activism	  
of	  the	  European	  Courts	  (Springer	  2013).	  22	  These	  comments	  supplement	  and	  develop	  those	  made	  in	  J	  A	  Sweeney,	  ‘Credibility,	  proof	  and	  refugee	  law’	  (2009)	  21(4)	  International	  Journal	  of	  Refugee	  Law	  700-­‐726	  and	  J	  A	  Sweeney,	  ‘The	  “lure”	  of	  facts	  in	  asylum	  appeals:	  critiquing	  the	  practice	  of	  judges’	  in	  Steven	  Smith	  (ed.)	  Applying	  
Theory	  to	  Policy	  and	  Practice:	  Issues	  for	  Critical	  Reflection	  	  (Ashgate	  2007),	  19-­‐35.	  23	  See	  Art	  15	  Directive	  2011/95/EU	  on	  standards	  for	  the	  qualification	  of	  third-­‐country	  nationals	  or	  stateless	  persons	  as	  beneficiaries	  of	  international	  protection,	  for	  a	  uniform	  status	  for	  refugees	  or	  for	  persons	  eligible	  for	  subsidiary	  protection,	  and	  for	  the	  content	  of	  the	  protection	  granted	  (EU	  Qualification	  Directive).	  	  Note	  that	  the	  UK	  has	  not	  accepted	  the	  recast	  Qualification	  Directive,	  and	  therefore	  remains	  bound	  by	  Directive	  2004/83/EC	  on	  minimum	  standards	  for	  the	  qualification	  and	  status	  of	  third	  country	  nationals	  or	  stateless	  persons	  as	  refugees	  or	  as	  persons	  who	  otherwise	  need	  international	  protection	  and	  the	  content	  of	  the	  protection	  granted.	  	  24	  On	  the	  interpretation	  of	  this	  see	  Case	  C-­‐465/07	  Elgafaji	  v	  Staatssecretaris	  van	  Justitie	  [2009]	  2	  CMLR	  45.	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The	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  deeply	  problematic,	  and	  has	  been	  for	  some	   time	   now.25	  	   According	   to	   a	   2013	   report	   of	   the	   Home	   Affairs	   Select	  Committee	   (which	   reviewed	   the	  whole	  of	   the	  RSD	  process	   in	   the	  UK),	   in	  2012	  30%	   of	   appeals	   against	   initial	   decisions	   were	   allowed.26	  	   The	   latest	   quarterly	  figures	   released	   by	   the	   Home	   Office	   present	   a	   similar	   picture:	   in	   the	   year	   to	  March	   2015,	   28%	   of	   appeals	   were	   allowed.27	  	   If	   at	   least	   a	   quarter	   of	   initial	  decisions	   are	   regularly	   wrongly	   decided,	   it	   suggests	   certain	   methodological	  weaknesses.	  	  We	  must	  also	  take	  into	  account	  that	  the	  appeals	  process	  in	  the	  UK	  is	   woefully	   truncated,	   and	   so	   many	   potentially	   flawed	   decisions	   are	   never	  challenged.	   	   Indeed,	   in	   June	  2015	  the	  UK’s	  High	  Court	   found	  that	  the	  especially	  atrophied	  appeals	  process	  for	  ‘detained	  fast-­‐track’	  applicants,	  which	  had	  been	  in	  operation	  for	  ten	  years,	  was	  unlawful	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  procedural	  safeguards.28	  	  	  	  	  Moreover,	  the	  picture	  is	  not	  the	  same	  for	  all	  applicants	  or	  all	  regions.	  	  The	  Home	  Affairs	  Select	  Committee	  found	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  allowed	  appeals	  was	  greater	  for	  women	  than	  men.29	  	  And	  returning	  to	  the	  main	  business	  of	  today,	  Syria,	  the	  2013	  Home	  Affairs	  Select	  Committee	  report	  found	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  allowed	  appeals	  for	  applicants	  from	  Syria	  was	  a	  staggering	  52%.30	  	  The	  issue	  for	  us	  is	  that	  within	  these	  successful	  appeals,	  the	  role	  of	  credibility	  has	  been	   central.	   	   In	   2013	   Amnesty	   International	   and	   Still	   Human	   Still	   Here	  published	  a	   joint	  report	  aptly	  entitled,	   ‘A	  Question	  of	  Credibility:	  Why	  so	  many	  initial	  asylum	  decisions	  are	  overturned	  on	  appeal	   in	   the	  UK’.31	  	   In	  42	  of	   the	  50	  randomly	   selected	   cases	   that	   the	   report	   examined,	   the	   Immigration	   Judge	  hearing	   the	   appeal	   indicated	   that,	   ‘the	   primary	   reason	   for	   an	   initial	   decision	  being	   overturned	   was	   that	   the	   [UK	   Border	   Agency]	   case	   owner	   had	   wrongly	  made	  a	  negative	  assessment	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  credibility.’32	  	  The	  2013	  Home	  Affairs	  Select	  Committee	  report	  devoted	  a	  whole	  section	  to	  what	  it,	  amongst	  others,	  has	  termed	  a	  ‘culture	  of	  disbelief’	  in	  decision	  makers.33	  	  At	  the	  time	  this	  paper	  was	  originally	  delivered,	  this	  culture	  was	  both	  manifested	  in	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  guidance	  given	  to	  decision	  makers	   in	  the	  UK34	  (new	  guidance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See	  Sweeney,	  ‘Credibility,	  proof,	  and	  refugee	  Law’	  (n22)	  at	  p702	  et	  seq	  for	  discussion	  of	  earlier	  materials.	  26	  House	  of	  Commons	  Home	  Affairs	  Committee,	  Asylum	  (2013-­‐14)	  HC	  71	  (incorporating	  (2012-­‐13)	  HC	  1072)	  	  27	  Home	  Office,	  ‘Immigration	  Statistics,	  January	  to	  March	  2015’	  (n	  11).	  28	  Detention	  Action	  v	  First-­‐Tier	  Tribunal	  (Immigration	  and	  Asylum	  Chamber)	  [2015]	  EWHC	  1689	  (Admin).	  29	  Home	  Affairs	  Committee	  (n26),	  12.	  30	  Ibid.	  31	  Jan	  Shaw	  and	  Mike	  Kay	  et	  al.,	  A	  Question	  of	  Credibility:	  Why	  so	  many	  initial	  asylum	  decisions	  are	  
overturned	  on	  appeal	  in	  the	  UK	  (Amnesty	  International	  /	  Still	  Human	  Still	  Here	  2013)	  <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/a_question_of_credibility_final_0.pdf>	  accessed	  12	  June	  2015.	  32	  Ibid,	  4	  &	  12.	  	  33	  Home	  Affairs	  Committee	  (n26),	  11	  et	  seq	  34	  Home	  Office,	  Considering	  Asylum	  Claims	  and	  Assessing	  Credibility,	  (8th	  edn,	  Home	  Office	  2012)	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was	   issued	   in	   January	   2015,	   and	   is	   discussed	   further	   below).35	  	   The	   previous	  guidance	  was	  notable	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  devoted	  just	  one	  page	  to,	  ‘Recording	  the	  consideration	  of	  a	  claim	  where	  asylum	  is	  to	  be	  granted’,	  whereas	  Pages	  44	  to	  59	  (some	  15	  pages)	  dealt	  with	  reasons	  for	  refusal,	  including	  stock	  text	  to	  be	  used.	  	  It	  is	   a	   significant	   and	   welcome	   development	   that	   this	   specious	   menu	   of	   refusal	  reasons	  has	  been	  excised	  from	  the	  guidance.	  	  This	  problem	  with	  credibility	  is	  not	  confined	  to	  the	  UK.	  	  The	  2013	  UNCHR	  report,	  ‘Beyond	  Proof:	  credibility	  in	  the	  EU	  Asylum	  systems’	  brought	  together	  a	  range	  of	  sources	   from	   within	   and	   beyond	   the	   EU,	   which	   indicated	   that,	   ‘a	   significant	  proportion	  of	  decisions	  to	  deny	  status	  are	  based	  wholly	  or	  partially	  on	  adverse	  credibility	  findings.’36	  	  
Carrying	  out	  credibility	  assessments:	  Academic	  input	  and	  the	  UK	  Guidance	  	  Having	  determined	  that	  there	  really	  is	  an	  issue	  in	  relation	  to	  credibility,	  we	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  carrying	  out	  an	  assessment	  of	  credibility.	   	  From	  the	  outset,	  we	  shall	   see	   that	  whilst	   there	   is	   some	  overlap	   in	   the	  different	  available	  guidance	   on	   carrying	   out	   these	   assessments,	   there	   is	   always	   ambiguity	   about	  their	  significance	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  case.	  	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster’s	  second	  edition	  of	  Hathaway’s	  influential	  book	  on	  the	  ‘The	  Law	  of	  Refugee	  Status’	   approaches	   the	   issue	  of	   credibility	   as	  one	  of	   examining	  the	   unsupported	   testimony	   of	   the	   applicant,	   noting	   the	   ‘clear	   salience’	   of	   an	  applicant’s	   own	   evidence.37	  	   Corroboration	   and	   wider	   issues	   of	   proof	   of	   an	  (objectively)38	  well-­‐founded	  fear	  are	  dealt	  with	  elsewhere.	  	  Thus,	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster’s	   guidance	   on	   carrying	   out	   credibility	   assessments	   is	   not	   about	   the	  strength	   of	   the	   case	   as	   a	   whole,	   but	   rather	   the	   very	   specific	   (albeit	   common)	  circumstance	   where	   the	   application	   for	   recognition	   hinges	   on	   the	   applicant’s	  own	  testimony.	  	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster	  have	  identified	  four	  commonly	  used	  techniques	   to	   determine	   credibility:	   checking	   the	   plausibility	   of	   the	   claimed	  circumstances;	  checking	  the	  applicant’s	  knowledge	  of	  relevant	  facts	  (such	  as	  the	  tenets	  of	  a	  particular	  persecuted	  faith);	  gauging	  the	  demeanour	  of	  the	  applicant;	  and	  checking	  the	  consistency	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  statements.39	  	  However,	  they	  go	  on	  to	  demonstrate	  problems	  within	  each	  technique	  and	  advise	  that,	  ‘[T]he	  tools	  available	   to	   assess	   the	   credibility	   of	   an	   applicant’s	   testimony	   are	   each	   highly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Home	  Office,	  Assessing	  credibility	  and	  refugee	  status,	  (9th	  edn,	  Home	  Office	  2015).	  	  NB	  whilst	  the	  name	  of	  this	  document	  has	  changed,	  the	  ‘Change	  record’	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  document	  sees	  this	  as	  a	  revised	  and	  re-­‐named	  9th	  edition	  of	  the	  document	  indicated	  in	  the	  previous	  footnote.	  	  36	  UNHCR,	  Beyond	  Proof:	  credibility	  in	  the	  EU	  Asylum	  systems	  (UNHCR	  2013),	  29.	  37	  James	  C	  Hathaway	  and	  Michelle	  Foster,	  The	  Law	  of	  Refugee	  Status	  (CUP	  2014),	  138.	  38	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster	  continue	  to	  be	  critical	  of	  the	  bipartite	  division	  of	  fear	  into	  subjective	  fear	  and	  objective	  risk,	  stating	  that	  ‘The	  concept	  of	  well-­‐founded	  fear	  is	  […]	  inherently	  objective’	  (ibid,	  92).	  	  This	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  UNHCR	  Handbook	  at	  para.	  37	  et	  seq,	  which	  characterizes	  the	  fear	  as	  having	  both	  objective	  and	  subjective	  elements	  (UNHCR	  Handbook	  on	  Procedures	  and	  
Criteria	  for	  Determining	  Refugee	  Status	  under	  the1951	  Convention	  and	  the	  1967	  Protocol	  relating	  
to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees,	  UN	  doc.	  HCR/IP/4/Eng/	  REV.1,	  2nd	  edn.,	  Geneva,	  1992).	  	  39	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster	  (n	  37),	  139.	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flawed.’40	  	   In	   the	   light	  of	   these	  weaknesses	   the	  guidance	  and	   training	  materials	  published	   via	   the	   Hungarian	   Helsinki	   Committee’s	   CREDO	   project	   are	  particularly	  welcome.41	  	  	  	  Whilst	   it	   is	   fair	   to	  say	  that	  Hathaway’s	  work	   in	  this	   field	  has	  been	  seminal,	  and	  that	  the	  new	  edition	  by	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster	  will	  likely	  continue	  that	  trend,	  the	  credibility	  tools	  that	  they	  have	  identified	  are	  not	  fully	  reflected	  in	  UK	  practice.	  	  At	  the	  time	  that	  this	  paper	  was	  first	  delivered,	  the	  Home	  Office	  credibility	  guidance	  to	  decision	  makers	  specified	  that	  they	  should	  consider:	  
• Internal	   credibility,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   applicant’s	   own	   evidence,	   and	  including	  the	  level	  of	  detail	  and	  impact	  of	  any	  inconsistencies;42	  
• External	  credibility,	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  checking	  whether	  the	   ‘material	   facts’	  of	  the	  claim	  are	  consistent	  with	  ‘objective	  evidence’;43	  
• The	  benefit	   of	   the	  doubt	  where,	   inter	  alia	   the	   ‘general	   credibility’	   of	   the	  applicant	  is	  established44	  and	  where	  there	  are	  no	  statutory	  presumptions	  against	  credibility;45	  
• Plausibility,	  but	  with	  a	  prior	  warning	  against	  speculation;	  
• Documentary	  evidence;	  
• Medical	  evidence.	  	  To	   some	   degree	   this	   advice	   (which	   in	   the	   above	   list	   is	   paraphrased)	   followed	  earlier	   UK	   guidance,46	  which	   itself	   seemed	   to	   replicate	   three	   categories	   of	   test	  that	   Amanda	   Weston	   had	   used	   to	   describe	   immigration	   Adjudicators’	   (now	  Immigration	   Judges)	   practice	   in	   her	   influential	   analysis	   published	   in	   1998;47	  namely	   internal	   credibility,	   external	   credibility,	   and	   plausibility.	   	   However	   the	  advice	   summarised	   above	   clearly	   conflates	   credibility	   in	   its	   narrow	   sense	  (pertaining	   to	   the	  unsupported	   statements	  by	   the	  applicant)	  with	  wider	   issues	  on	   corroboration	   and	   proof	   (including	   the	   consideration	   of	   documentary	   and	  medical	   evidence).	   	   Indeed	   in	   relation	   to	   internally	   credible	   but	   unsupported	  statements,	   the	   guidance	   gave	   the	   troubling	   advice	   that,	   ‘Facts	   which	   are	  internally	  credible	  but	  lack	  any	  external	  evidence	  to	  confirm	  them	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  ‘unsubstantiated’	  or	  ‘uncertain’	  or	  ‘doubtful’’.48	  	  It	  is	  a	  relief	  that	  this	  sentence	  has	  been	  excised	  from	  the	  current	  guidance.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster	  (n	  37),	  148.	  41	  Details	  can	  be	  found	  at	  <	  http://helsinki.hu/en/credo-­‐–-­‐improving-­‐credibility-­‐assessment-­‐in-­‐eu-­‐asylum-­‐procedures>	  accessed	  15	  June	  2015.	  	  Note	  also	  the	  2015	  second	  volume	  of	  the	  CREDO	  training	  manual	  available	  at	  <	  http://helsinki.hu/en/hhc-­‐multidisciplinary-­‐manual-­‐on-­‐credibility-­‐assessment-­‐–-­‐second-­‐volume>	  accessed	  15	  June	  2015.	  42	  Home	  Office	  guidance	  8th	  edn.	  (n34),	  13.	  43	  Home	  Office	  guidance	  8th	  edn.	  (n34),	  14.	  44	  By	  reference	  to	  Immigration	  Rule	  339L.	  45	  Such	  as	  specified	  in	  Section	  8	  of	  the	  Asylum	  and	  Immigration	  (Treatment	  of	  Claimants,	  etc)	  Act	  2004	  46	  This	  was	  the	  guidance	  analysed	  in	  detail	  in	  Sweeney,	  ‘Credibility,	  proof,	  and	  refugee	  Law’	  (n22).	  47	  A	  Weston	  ‘“A	  witness	  of	  truth”	  –	  credibility	  findings	  in	  asylum	  appeals’	  (1998)	  12	  Immigration	  
and	  Nationality	  Law	  and	  Practice	  87,	  88.	  48	  Home	  Office	  guidance	  8th	  edn.	  (n34),	  16	  (emphasis	  added).	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As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  current	  guidance	  was	  published	  in	  January	  2015,	  and	  in	  many	  respects	  it	  is	  an	  improvement.	  	  It	  is	  more	  coherent,	  more	  straightforwardly	  presented,	   and	   contains	   much	   useful	   guidance	   on	   making	   structured	  assessments	   of	   an	   applicant’s	   claim	   for	   international	   protection.	   	   However	   it	  makes	  no	  reference	  to	   the	  CREDO	  materials,	  and	  still	  presents	  credibility	  as	  an	  issue	   of	   proof,	   stating	   that,	   ‘Once	   the	   material	   facts	   of	   the	   case	   have	   been	  identified,	   it	   is	   then	   necessary	   to	   assess	   their	   credibility	   against	   the	   correct	  standard	  of	  proof.’49	  	  Indeed	  the	  main	  guidance	  on	  credibility	  is	  given	  under	  the	  faintly	  (oxy)moronic	  heading,	  ‘Assessing	  credibility:	  the	  low	  standard	  of	  proof’.	  	  	  The	   current	   guidance	   continues	   by	   stating	   that,	   ‘keeping	   the	   relatively	   low	  standard	   of	   proof	   in	  mind,	   the	   claimant’s	   statements	   and	  other	  evidence	   about	  the	  facts	  being	  established	  can	  be	  accepted	  if	  they	  are:	  
• of	  sufficient	  detail	  and	  specificity	  
• internally	  consistent	  and	  coherent	  (to	  a	  reasonable	  degree)	  
• consistent	  with	  specific	  and	  general	  [country	  of	  origin	  information]	  
• consistent	  with	  other	  evidence	  (to	  a	  reasonable	  degree)	  
• plausible’	  [emphasis	  added].	  	  This,	   again,	   seems	   to	   combine	   the	   question	   of	   proof	   of	   all	   material	   facts	   (i.e.	  whether	   the	   statements	   and	   other	   evidence	   are	   ‘accepted’)	   with	   the	   narrower	  issue	  of	  identifying	  common	  techniques	  to	  assess	  the	  credibility	  of	  unsupported	  statements.	  	  Before	  we	  return	  to	  the	  hotly	  contested	  relationship	  between	  proof,	  credibility,	  and	  also	  the	   ‘benefit	  of	  the	  doubt’	  principle,	   I	  would	  like	  briefly	  to	  reiterate	  my	  observations	  about	  the	  notion	  of	  plausibility.	  	  	  
‘Objective’	  evidence,	  plausibility	  and	  the	  ‘reasonable	  persecutor’	  	  There	   is	  a	   tendency	   to	   see	   information	  provided	  by	   the	  state	  as	  presumptively	  correct,	  whereas	   in	  relation	   to	   the	   testimony	  of	   the	  applicant	   there	   is	  evidence	  that	   there	   is	   distrust	   of	   the	   applicant’s	   testimony.	   	   As	   to	   the	   latter,	   and	   as	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster	  have	  also	  noted,50	  Lord	  Walker	   in	   the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court	  recently	   stated	   that,	   ‘[the	   applicant’s]	   evidence	   may	   have	   to	   be	   treated	   with	  caution	  because	  of	  his	  strong	  personal	  interest	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  his	  claim.’51	  	  As	   to	   the	   former,	   the	   information	  provided	  by	   the	   state	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   as	  ‘Objective’	   evidence,	   reinforcing	   its	   presumptive	   claim	   to	   authenticity.	   	   This	  exposes	  complex	  power	  dynamics,	  which	  I	  have	  noted	  previously,52	  and	  which	  is	  discussed	   further	   in	   a	   2010	   report	   of	   the	   Immigration	   Advisory	   Service	   (a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Home	  Office	  guidance	  9th	  edn.	  (n35),	  11.	  50	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster	  (n37),	  138.	  51	  HJ	  (Iran)	  [2010]	  UKSC	  31,	  [88],	  per	  Lord	  Walker.	  	  To	  be	  fair,	  that	  case	  is	  a	  hugely	  significant	  one	  in	  dismantling	  the	  suggestion	  that	  gay	  people’s	  fear	  of	  persecution	  can	  be	  negated	  by	  behaving	  ‘discreetly’.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Lord	  Walker’s	  comments	  unfortunate	  in	  this	  context.	  52	  Sweeney	  (2007)	  n22.	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charity;	   hereafter	   IAS).53	  	   In	   their	   report,	   ‘The	   Refugee	   Roulette:	   The	   role	   of	  country	   information	   in	   refugee	   status	   determination’,54	  the	   IAS	   highlighted	   the	  creation	  and	  preservation	  of	  a	  ‘hierarchy	  of	  knowledge’	  within	  the	  RSD	  process,	  and	  echoed	  my	  own	  concerns.55	  	  	  	  The	   hierarchical	   superiority	   of	   ‘objective’	   country	   of	   origin	   information	   is	  particularly	  troubling	  in	  the	  light	  of,	  for	  example,	  the	  observations	  of	  John	  Vine,	  the	  UK’s	  then	  Chief	  Inspector	  of	  Borders	  and	  Immigration,	  in	  2011,	  that	  in	  one	  in	  six	   cases	   examined,	   country	   of	   origin	   information	   was	   used	   selectively.56	  	   A	  further	   one	   in	   eight	   reasons	   for	   refusal	   letters	   contained,	   ‘country	   information	  which	   was,	   at	   best,	   tangential	   to	   the	   issues	   relevant	   to	   the	   asylum	   claim.’57	  	  Significantly,	  the	  report	  highlighted	  the	  risk	  that	  where	  no	  information	  relevant	  to	   the	   precise	   application	   for	   international	   protection	   was	   included	   in	   the	  country	   of	   origin	   information,	   case	   owners	   might	   assume,	   ‘that	   an	   applicant’s	  evidence	  was	  not	  credible.’58	  	   It	   is	  notable	   that	   these	  concerns	  about	   the	  use	  of	  COI	  information	  were	  made	  some	  time	  after	  the	  NA	  case59	  in	  which	  by	  finding	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  3	  ECHR	  the	  ECtHR	  had	  come	  to	  the	  opposite	  conclusion	  about	  a	  particular	  applicant’s	  risk	  on	  return,	  in	  a	  case	  where	  the	  UK	  had	  apparently	  put	  much	  greater	  weight	  on	  its	  own	  sources	  than	  those	  supplied	  by	  UNHCR.60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  If	   the	   state’s	   own	   evidence	   may	   be	   treated	   with	   some	   reverence	   by	   decision	  makers,	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  for	  the	  applicant’s	  own	  testimony.	  	  Nowhere	  is	  this	  clearer	  than	   in	  attempts	  to	  check	  for	  the	   ‘plausibility’	  of	   the	  account	  given.	  	  In	   their	   examination	   of	   credibility	   Hathaway	   and	   Foster	   have	   called	   for	   ‘real	  humility’	  in	  testing	  for	  plausibility.61	  	  	  Such	   humility	   is	   certainly	   needed,	  with	   the	  UK	  Home	  Affairs	   Select	   Committee	  echoing	   the	   concerns	   of	   UNHCR	   that	   in	   the	   UK	   caseworkers	   frequently	   use	  speculative	  arguments	  to	  undermine	  credibility.62	  	  Quite	  possibly	  the	  worst	  form	  of	   speculation	   is	   what	   might	   be	   termed	   the	   invocation	   of	   the	   ‘reasonable	  persecutor’	   standard.	   	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   decision	   makers	   seem	   prone	   to	   judging	  certain	  asylum	  applicants’	  escape	  according	  to	  the	  ruthless	  efficiency	  expected	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Note	  that	  the	  Immigration	  Advisory	  Service	  (registered	  charity	  1033192)	  went	  into	  administration	  in	  2012,	  and	  a	  private	  company	  giving	  immigration	  advice	  now	  trades	  under	  the	  same	  name.	  	  See	  the	  records	  of	  the	  UK’s	  Charity	  Commission	  available	  at	  <	  http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/RemovedCharityMain.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1033192&SubsidiaryNumber=0>	  accessed	  15	  June	  2015.	  54	  Immigration	  Advisory	  Service	  (IAS),	  The	  Refugee	  Roulette:	  The	  Role	  of	  Country	  Information	  in	  
Refugee	  Status	  Determination	  (IAS	  2010)	  <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b62a6182.html>	  accessed	  15	  June	  2015.	  55	  Ibid,	  96.	  56	  John	  Vine,	  the	  Independent	  Chief	  Inspector	  of	  Borders	  and	  Immigration,	  The	  use	  of	  country	  of	  
origin	  information	  in	  deciding	  asylum	  applications:	  A	  thematic	  inspection	  (ICI	  UKBA	  2011)	  <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-­‐content/uploads/2011/02/Use-­‐of-­‐country-­‐of-­‐origin-­‐information-­‐in-­‐deciding-­‐asylum-­‐applications.pdf>	  accessed	  15	  June	  2015,	  3.	  57	  Ibid.	  58	  Ibid.	  59	  NA	  v	  UK	  	  App	  no	  25904/07	  (ECHR,	  17	  July	  2008);[2008]	  ECHR	  616.	  60	  See	  the	  applicant’s	  arguments	  ibid,	  [99].	  61	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster	  (n37),	  140.	  62	  Home	  Affairs	  Committee	  (n26),	  13.	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the	  ‘reasonable’	  persecutor.	  	  This	  has	  several	  consequences.	  	  One	  might	  argue	  it	  amounts	  to	  saying	  that	  the	  applicant	  is	  disbelieved	  because	  they	  survived.	  	  Or	  it	  might	  appear	  as	   if	   the	  decision	  maker	   is	  hypothesising	   that	   if	   they	  had	  been	   in	  the	   shoes	   of	   the	   persecutor,	   they	   could	   have	   done	   a	   ‘better’	   job	   of	   the	  persecution.	  	  	  	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  the	  UK’s	  Upper	  Tribunal	  has	  accepted	  the	  existence	  of	   this	  phenomenon	  –	   and	   that	   such	   reasoning	   is	  unlawful.	   	   In	   the	   case	  of	   IA	  v	  
Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   the	   Home	   Department63	  the	   applicant	   was	   an	   educated,	  single,	   Iraqi	  Sunni	  with	   three	  children,	  who	  had	  worked	   in	   Iraq	  as	  an	  architect	  and	  senior	  administrator	  with	  an	  international	  NGO.	  	  Both	  her	  car	  and	  home	  had	  been	   targeted	   with	   gunfire	   (without	   injury);	   and	   the	   National	   Guard	   had	  aggressively	  questioned	  the	  children	  about	  the	  absence	  of	  their	  father.	  	  	  	  	  In	  an	  initial	  appeal	  the	  First	  Tier	  Immigration	  Judge,	  Judge	  Mensah,	  had	  said	  that	  it	  made	  ‘no	  sense’	  for	  the	  National	  Guard	  to	  question	  the	  children	  if	  they	  already	  knew	   the	   applicant	  worked	   for	   an	  NGO.64	  	  According	   to	   the	  Upper	  Tribunal,	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  incidents	  of	  gunfire,	  Judge	  Mensah	  had	  found	  that,	  ‘If	  they	  wanted	  to	  persecute	  her	  because	  they	  believed	  she	  was	  working	  for	  a	  foreign	  company	  they	  could	  have	  simply	  killed	  her	  or	  kidnapped	  her.’65	  	  	  	  At	  the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  it	  was	  successfully	  argued66	  that,	  inter	  alia,	  Judge	  Mensah,	  ‘had	  unlawfully	  substituted	  her	  own	  view	  of	  what	  a	  reasonable	  persecutor	  would	  do	  at	  a	  number	  of	  points	  in	  the	  determination.’67	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  First-­‐tier	   tribunal	   judge	   was	   set	   aside,	   and	   the	   Upper	   Tribunal	   remade	   the	  decision,	  allowing	  the	  appeal	  on	  asylum	  grounds.68	  	  So	  there	  is	  clear	  acceptance	  that	  deploying	  the	   ‘reasonable	  persecutor’	  within	  credibility	  assessments	   is	  not	  lawful.	   	  However,	  this	  decision	  is	  currently	   ‘unreported’,	  meaning	  that	  although	  the	  text	  is	  available	  online,	  it	  cannot	  ordinarily	  be	  raised	  before	  the	  tribunal	  and	  therefore	   has	   limited	   value	   as	   precedent.	   	   This	   does	   not	   prevent	   the	   same	  argument	  being	  run	  again	  independently	  though,	  but	  this	  perhaps	  shows	  that	  the	  real	  issue	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  decisions	  are	  properly	  reasoned	  from	  the	  outset.	  	  	  	  The	  new	  UK	  guidance	  has	  made	  an	  important	  contribution	  here.	  	  It	  clearly	  states	  that,	   ‘Caseworkers	   must	   not	   base	   implausibility	   findings	   on	   their	   own	  assumptions,	   conjecture,	   or	   speculative	   ideas	  of	  what	  ought	   to	  have	  happened,	  […]	  or	  how	  they	  think	  a	  third	  party	  would	  have	  acted	  in	  the	  circumstances.’69	  	  This	  would	   seem	   to	   be	   fairly	   clear	   discouragement	   of	   the	   ‘reasonable	   persecutor’	  approach,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  to	  be	  welcomed.	  	  Of	  course	   in	  relation	  to	  persons	  who	  are	  fleeing	  indiscriminate	  violence	  we	  are	  concerned	  not	  so	  much	  with	  persecution	  as	  with	  ‘serious	  harm’.	  	  But	  the	  role	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  IA	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Home	  Department	  [2013]	  UKAITUR	  AA014932011	  	  64	  Ibid,	  [6].	  65	  Ibid,	  [6].	  66	  Ibid,	  [17].	  67	  Ibid,	  [15].	  68	  Ibid,	  [37].	  69	  Home	  Office	  guidance	  9th	  edn.	  (n35),	  17	  [emphasis	  added].	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‘credibility’	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   facts	   giving	   rise	   either	   to	   a	  well-­‐founded	   fear	   of	  persecution	   or	   a	   real	   risk	   of	   serious	   harm	   is	   the	   same.	   	   This	   brings	   us	   to	  my	  second	   key	   point:	   the	   precise	   legal	   role	   of	   credibility	   assessment	   and	   its	  relationship	  to	  the	  ‘benefit	  of	  the	  doubt’.	  	  	  	  
Credibility	  and	  the	  Benefit	  of	  the	  Doubt	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  make	  related	  points	  about	  credibility	  and	  the	  ‘benefit	  of	  the	  doubt’.	  	  Both	  are	  susceptible	  to	  being	  used	  to	  convey	  a	  variety	  of	  meanings.	  	  For	  example,	   it	   was	   noted	   above	   that	   the	   2015	   UK	   guidance	   called	   for	   decision	  makers	   to	  assess	   the	   ‘credibility’	  of	   ‘material	   facts’	   against	   the	   low	  standard	  of	  proof;	  whereas	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster	  see	  credibility	  as	  being	  about	  checking	  the	  applicant’s	   unsupported	   statements.70	  	   Likewise	   the	   ‘benefit	   of	   the	   doubt’	   is	  sometimes	  understood	  as	  referring	  to	  the	  low	  standard	  of	  proof	  in	  asylum	  cases,	  and	  sometimes	  as	  relevant	  to	  the	  prior	  question	  of	  evidential	  admissibility.	  	  I	  will	  show	   that	   the	   latter	   understanding	   not	   only	   overlaps	   with	   a	   narrow	  understanding	  of	  credibility,	  but	  adds	  a	  normative	  dimension	  to	  it	  by	  reminding	  us	   that	  where	  an	  applicant’s	  unsupported	  statements	  are	   ‘credible’	   they	  should	  be	   given	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   doubt	   and	   have	   such	   statements	   considered	  when	  assessing	  whether	  the	  (low)	  standard	  of	  proof	  has	  been	  met.	  	  	  The	   UK’s	   Upper	   Tribunal	   has	   recently	   delivered	   an	   important	   (reported)	  determination	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   doubt	   in	   the	   case	   of	   KS	   v	  
Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   the	  Home	  Department.71	  	   This	   case	   provides	   a	   route	   into	  discussion	   of	   both	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   doubt	   and	   credibility,	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  revised	  1979	  UNHCR	  Handbook.72	  	  The	   KS	   determination	   was	   promulgated	   in	   May	   2014.	   	   It	   concerned	   a	   young	  Afghan	   who	   arrived	   in	   the	   UK	   in	   June	   2008,	   and	   who	   immediately	   claimed	  asylum.	   	  His	   application	  was	   refused,	   and	   the	   First-­‐tier	   Tribunal	   dismissed	   his	  appeal	  in	  January	  2013.	  	  	  	  The	  age	  of	  the	  applicant	  was	  contested	  (he	  claimed	  to	  have	  been	  aged	  14	  on	  arrival).	  	  His	  claimed	  fear	  was	  of	  forcible	  recruitment	  into	  Islamist	   militia	   Hezb-­‐i-­‐Islami	   (in	   which	   his	   father	   was	   a	   commander;	   and	   in	  which	  his	  elder	  brother	  was	  active),	  or	  the	  Taliban;	  or,	  conversely,	  that	  he	  would	  be	   considered	   a	   suspect	   in	   a	   2008	   bombing	   due	   to	   his	   family’s	   terrorist	  connections	   (since	   2007	   his	   house	   had	   been	   searched	   on	   at	   least	   two	  occasions).73	  	  The	  application	  was	  refused	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  applicant	  had,	  ‘failed	  to	  give	  a	  credible	   account’	   of	   either	   his	   age	   or	   the	   events	   back	   in	   Afghanistan. 74	  	  Documentation	  provided	  by	  the	  applicant	  was	  deemed	  unreliable.75	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster	  (n37),	  139,	  framing	  the	  issue	  as	  that,	  ‘it	  remains	  that	  decision-­‐makers	  must	  somehow	  find	  a	  way	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  are	  valid	  reasons	  to	  impugn	  the	  truthfulness	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  testimony.’	  71	  KS	  (benefit	  of	  the	  doubt)	  [2014]	  UKUT	  552	  (IAC)	  72	  UNHCR	  Handbook	  (n38).	  73	  KS	  (benefit	  of	  the	  doubt)	  (n71).	  	  The	  basis	  of	  the	  claim	  is	  outlined	  at	  [28].	  74	  Ibid,	  [30]	  75	  Ibid,	  [30]	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  The	  First-­‐tier	  Tribunal,	   hearing	  his	   initial	   appeal,	   found	   that	   the	   applicant	  was	  around	  16	  years	  old	  in	  2008;	  but	  that	  he,	  ‘had	  not	  given	  a	  credible	  account	  of	  his	  experiences	   in	   Afghanistan	   or	   of	   his	   fears	   about	   return	   to	   that	   country.’	   	   The	  Immigration	   Judge	   hearing	   that	   appeal,	   Judge	   Knowles,	   then	   considered	   the	  guidance	   in	   paras.	   214-­‐215	   of	   the	   UNHCR	   Handbook	   that	   there	   should	   be	   a	  ‘liberal’	  application	  of	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt	  in	  the	  case	  of	  minors.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  applicant	  had,	   ‘undertaken	  successfully	  what	  must	  have	  been	  an	  arduous	  5	  month	   journey	   to	   the	  UK’;	   that	   there	  was	   no	   evidence	   of	   immaturity	   from	   the	  medical	  evidence;	  and	  that	  he	  was,	  	  ‘certainly	  mature	  enough	  to	  give	  his	  solicitor	  a	  very	  comprehensive	  account’	  of	   the	  material	   facts	  of	   the	  case,	   Judge	  Knowles	  found	  that	  the	  applicant	  was	  ‘sufficiently	  mature’	  to	  have	  formed	  a	  well-­‐founded	  fear	  of	  persecution.	  	  Thus,	  Judge	  Knowles	  continued,	  ‘In	  those	  circumstances,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that,	  where	  issues	  of	  credibility	  arise,	  the	  appellant	  need	  necessarily	  be	   given	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   doubt	   on	   account	   of	   his	   age	   and	   maturity.’76	  	   The	  argument	  before	   the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  was	   that	   this	   failure	   to	  give	   the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt	  was	  an	  error	  of	  law.	  	  The	   Upper	   Tribunal	   reasoned	   in	   this	   case	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   ‘benefit	   of	   the	  doubt’	   cannot	   be	   considered	   a	   legal	   rule	   in	   and	   of	   itself.77	  	   On	   that	   point,	   the	  appeal	   by	   KS	   to	   the	  Upper	   Tribunal	  was	   not	   successful.78	  	   However	   the	  Upper	  Tribunal	   found	   enough	   unreasoned	   conclusions	   and	   non-­‐sequiturs	   in	   Judge	  Knowles’	   decision	   that	   it	   could	   be	   set	   aside	   anyway,	   and	   it	   was	   listed	   for	   an	  expedited	  re-­‐hearing.	  	  We	   need	   to	   return	   to	   the	   point	   about	   the	   ‘benefit	   of	   the	   doubt’	   though.	   	   The	  Upper	  Tribunal	  proposed	  (at	  least)	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  term	  is	  deployed:	  as	  a	   pervasive	   principle	   (being	   considered	   in	   relation	   to	   each	   and	   every	   claimed	  fact;	  and	  at	  the	  point	  of	  considering	  risk);	  as	  an	  end-­‐point	  consideration	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say	  before	  ‘signing	  off’	  on	  the	  final	  decision	  as	  to	  the	  existence	  or	  otherwise	  of	  a	   well-­‐founded	   fear	   (or	   real	   risk	   of	   serious	   harm);79	  and	   as	   playing	   a	   more	  
holistic	  role.	  	  The	  Tribunal	  rejected	  the	  pervasive	  approach,	  because	  there	  will	  be	  some	  facts	  that	  can	  be	  established	  or	  rejected	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	   doubt	   (because	   they	   are	   so	   clear).80	  	   The	   Tribunal	   rejected	   the	   end-­‐point	  formulation,	  which	   it	   understood	   as	  being	   rooted	   in	   the	  UNHCR	  Handbook,	   on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  is	  too	  limited.81	  	  Instead	  the	  tribunal	  stressed	  the	  more	  holistic	  approach,	   applying	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   doubt	   even	   at	   an	   early	   stage	   of	   the	  credibility	  assessment	  (but	  without	  being	  pervasive).82	  	  According	  to	  the	  Upper	  Tribunal,	  the	  holistic	  approach	  ‘is	   simply	  no	  more	   than	  an	  acceptance	   that	   in	   respect	  of	   every	   asserted	  fact	  when	  there	  is	  doubt,	  the	  lower	  standard	  entails	  that	  it	  should	  not	  be	  rejected	  and	  should	  rather	  continue	  to	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  as	  a	  possibility	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Ibid,	  [32]	  77	  Ibid,	  [61]	  78	  Ibid,	  [104]	  79	  Ibid,	  [76]	  80	  Ibid,	  [68]	  81	  Ibid,	  [70],	  [72]	  82	  Ibid,	  [71]	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least	  until	   the	  end	  when	   the	  question	  or	   risk	   is	  posed	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  evidence	  considered	  in	  the	  round.’83	  	  The	  Tribunal	  therefore	  felt	  that	  in	  essence	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt	  is	  not	  a	  legal	  principle	  per	   se,	   but	   is	  merely	   an	   expression,	   reiteration,	   or	   component	   of	   the	  idea	  that	  the	  standard	  of	  proof	  in	  asylum	  claims	  is	  low.84	  	  However,	  this	  potential	  approach,	   embodied	   in	   the	  quotation	  above,	   elides	   the	  distinction	  between	   the	  evidential	   admissibility	   of	   unsupported	   but	   credible	   statements;	   and	   the	  weighing	  of	   those	  statements	  (and	  other	  evidence)	  against	   the	   low	  standard	  of	  proof.	  	  At	  this	  point	  a	  detour	  into	  the	  EU	  QD	  and	  UNHCR	  Handbook	  is	  necessary.	  	  	  	  The	  EU	  QD	  and	  UNHCR	  Handbook	  	  The	  Upper	  Tribunal	  in	  KS	  also	  discussed	  whether	  the	  alleviating	  evidential	  rule	  contained	  in	  Article	  4(5)	  QD	  is	  a	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt	  rule.	   	  The	  Upper	  Tribunal	  actually	  reasoned	  that	  the	  term	  should	  not	  apply	  to	  that	  rule	  because	  Article	  4(5)	  only	  applies	  to	  uncorroborated	  statements	  and,	  following	  the	  analysis	  of	  Noll,85	  the	   rule	   in	  Article	  4(5)	   is	   stricter	   than	   the	   comparable	  guidance	   in	   the	  UNHCR	  Handbook.86	  	   I	  would	   agree	   that	   the	   EU	  QD	   is	   stricter	   than	   the	  Handbook,	   but	  Article	  4(5)	  it	  is	  clearly	  derived	  from	  the	  Handbook	  and	  might	  therefore	  be	  more	  accurately	  described	  as	  a	  flawed	  or	  incomplete	  manifestation	  thereof.	  	  Crucially,	  it	   is	  at	  this	  point	  that	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  ‘benefit	  of	  the	  doubt’	  overlaps	  with	  the	  correct,	  and	  narrow,	  understanding	  of	  credibility	   in	   the	  process	  of	  determining	  the	  need	  for	  international	  protection.	  	  Let	  us	  just	  remind	  ourselves	  what	  the	  UNHCR	  Handbook	  actually	  says,	  accepting	  that	  it	  is	  not	  written	  as	  a	  set	  of	  legal	  provisions	  but	  as	  practical	  guidance.	  	  In	  para.	  195,	  it	  is	  explained	  that	  the	  decision	  maker	  will	  have	  to,	  ‘assess	  the	  validity	  of	  any	  
evidence	   and	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   applicant's	   statements.’	   	   It	   is	   thus	   clear	   that	  credibility	  is	  relevant	  (only)	  to	  the	  applicant’s	  statements.	  	  In	  para.	  196	   it	   is	   explained	   that	  applicants,	   ‘may	  not	  be	  able	   to	   support	   [their]	  statements	   by	   documentary	   or	   other	   proof’.	   	   Although	   the	   burden	   is	   on	   the	  applicant,	  the	  decision	  maker	  may	  need	  to	  use,	  ‘all	  the	  means	  at	  [their]	  disposal	  to	  produce	  the	  necessary	  evidence	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  application.’	  	  However,	  there	  will	  still	  be	  times	  when	  such	  research	  is	  not	  successful,	  and	  there	  may	  be	  other	  statements	  that	  are,	  ‘not	  susceptible	  of	  proof’.	  	  It	  is	  here	  where	  credibility	  and	  the	  benefit	   of	   the	   doubt	   first	   collide,	   with	   the	   guidance	   that,	   ‘In	   such	   cases,	   if	   the	  applicant's	  account	  appears	  credible,	  he	  should,	  unless	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  the	  contrary,	  be	  given	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt.’	  [emphasis	  added].	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Ibid,	  [73]	  84	  Ibid,	  [64]	  85	  G	  Noll,	  Evidentiary	  assessment	  and	  the	  EU	  qualification	  directive	  (UNHCR	  2005)	  <	  http://www.unhcr.org/42bbcb092.html>	  accessed	  15	  June	  2015;	  note	  that	  this	  was	  partially	  revised	  and	  also	  published	  as	  G	  Noll,	  ‘Evidentiary	  Assessment	  in	  Refugee	  Status	  Determination	  and	  the	  EU	  Qualification	  Directive’	  (2006)	  12(2)	  European	  Public	  Law	  295.	  86	  KS	  (benefit	  of	  the	  doubt)	  (n71),	  [85].	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This	   reference	   to	   the	  benefit	  of	   the	  doubt	   is	   therefore	  given	  very	  clearly	   in	   the	  context	   of	   a	   paragraph	   discussing	   the	   situation	   where	   the	   applicant	   has	   no	  
supporting	   evidence.	   	   At	   this	   point,	   the	   conditions	   for	   giving	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	  doubt	  are	  not	  specified,	  except	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  applicant’s	  account	  would	  have	  to	  be	  ‘credible’.	  	  The	  conditions	  are	  given	  in	  para.	  203.	  	  	  In	  para.	  203,	  it	  is	  repeated	  that,	  ‘After	  the	  applicant	  has	  made	  a	  genuine	  effort	  to	  substantiate	   his	   story	   there	   may	   still	   be	   a	   lack	   of	   evidence	   for	   some	   of	   his	  statements.	   […]	   	   It	   is	   therefore	   frequently	   necessary	   to	   give	   the	   applicant	   the	  benefit	   of	   the	   doubt.’	   	   It	   is	   then	   explained	   that	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   doubt	   (still	  clearly	   in	   relation	   to	   unsupported	   statements)	   should	   only	   be	   given	  when,	   ‘all	  available	  evidence	  has	  been	  obtained	  and	  checked’.	   	  This	   is	  not	  about	   the	  end-­‐point	   decision	   on	   fear	   or	   serious	   harm,	   but	   about	   ensuring	   that	   the	   decision	  maker	  has	  properly	  discharged	  their	  duties.	   	  The	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt	  is	  then	  to	  be	   given	   (only)	   when	   the	   decision	   maker	   is,	   ‘satisfied	   as	   to	   the	   applicant’s	  general	  credibility’,	   and	  when	   the	   (unsupported)	  statements	  are,	   ‘coherent	  and	  plausible,	  and	  [do]	  not	  run	  counter	  to	  generally	  known	  facts.’87	  	  These	  are	  very	  close	   to	   the	   terms	   usually	   used	   to	   describe	   techniques	   for	   determining	  credibility.	  	  	  Thus	   the	   UNCHR	   Handbook	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   doubt	   is	  about	  allowing	  unsupported	  but	  credible	  statements	  to	  count	  towards	  satisfying	  the	   standard	   of	   proof	   (the	   actual	   standard	   of	   proof,	   and	   the	  whole	   notion	   of	   a	  ‘well-­‐founded	   fear’	   is	   discussed	   at	   length	   elsewhere	   in	   the	  Handbook.)	   	  This	   is	  precisely	   the	   role	   indicated	   for	   credibility	   assessments	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster,	  noted	  above.88	  	  It	  is	  also	  what	  I	  have	  previously	  termed	  a	  ‘narrow’	  understanding	  of	  ‘credibility	  as	  admissibility’,89	  drawing	  upon	  the	  work,	  in	   particular,	   of	   Kagan90	  and	  Noll.91	  	   The	  March	   2015	   EASO	   Practical	   Guide	   on	  Evidence	   Assessment	   also	   clearly	   confines	   credibility	   assessment	   to	   assessing	  the	  statements	  of	  the	  applicant.92	  	  	  	  	  Let	  me	  recap:	  the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  reasoned	  in	  KA	  that	  ‘the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt’	  is	  not	  a	   legal	   rule	  but	   rather	  a	  non-­‐legal	  expression	  of	   the	   low	  standard	  of	  proof,	  which	   is	   encountered	   holistically	   (but	   not	   pervasively)	   throughout	   the	  determination	  process.	  	  However,	  I	  would	  develop	  their	  reasoning	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	   4(5)	  QD	   (which	   clearly	   is	   a	   legal	   rule	   of	   EU	   law;	   and	   applies	   equally	   to	  refugee	   and	   subsidiary	   protection	   cases)	   in	   the	   following	  way:	   the	   expression	  ‘benefit	  of	  the	  doubt’	  is	  also	  used,	  especially	  in	  the	  UNHCR	  Handbook,	  to	  call	  for	  the	   application	   of	   an	   alleviating	   evidential	   rule	   in	   relation	   to	   an	   applicant’s	  unsupported	  but	  credible	  statements.	   	  Within	   the	  EU,	   that	  rule	   is	  partially,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  UNHCR	  Handbook	  (n38),	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  88	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  and	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  89	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imperfectly,	   expressed	   in	   Article	   4(5)	   QD.93	  	   On	   this	   understanding,	   the	   term	  ‘benefit	  of	  the	  doubt’,	  as	  an	  expression,	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  legal	  notion	  of	  credibility	  (narrowly	  understood).	  	  	  	  The	  term	  ‘benefit	  of	  the	  doubt’	  is	  thus,	  confusingly,	  used	  as	  non-­‐legal	  expression	  for	   two	   related,	   but	   distinct,	   ideas:	   that	   unsupported	   but	   credible	   statements	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  assessing	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  well-­‐founded	  fear	  of	   persecution	   (or	   risk	   of	   serious	   harm);	   and	   that	   in	   carrying	   out	   such	   an	  assessment	   the	   overall	   standard	   of	   proof	   is	   low.	   	   I	   agree	  with	   the	   UK’s	   Upper	  Tribunal	   that	   the	   ‘benefit	  of	   the	  doubt’	   is	  not	  a	   legal	   concept	   in	  and	  of	   itself	   in	  either	  sense	  but,	  like	  it	  or	  not,	  it	  has	  come	  to	  be	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  two	  notions	  that	  certainly	  do	  have	  legal	  implications:	  credibility	  and	  the	  standard	  of	  proof.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  linking	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt	  to	  credibility	  assessment	  	  	  The	  point	  of	  linking	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt	  to	  ‘credibility	  as	  admissibility’	  is	  that	  it	   allows	   for	   the	   reorientation	   of	   our	   understanding	   of	   credibility.	   	   In	   the	   first	  part	   of	   this	   paper,	   I	   referred	   to	   a	   range	   of	   reports	   that	   suggested	   that	   deeply	  problematic	   negative	   credibility	   findings	   have	   given	   rise	   to	   perceptions	   of	   a	  ‘culture	  of	  disbelief’	  in	  some	  states.	  	  Establishing	  credibility	  has	  become	  a	  major	  hurdle,	   almost	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of	   proving	   a	  well-­‐founded	   fear	   (or	   real	   risk	   of	  serious	  harm).	  	  Because	  there	  is	  no	  legal	  guidance	  on	  how	  ‘credible’	  a	  statement	  needs	  to	  be,	  the	  standard	  of	  proof	  can	  be	  inadvertently	  raised.94	  	  Yet,	  admitting	  ‘credible’	  statements	  for	  consideration	  relative	  to	  standard	  of	  proof	  is	  meant	  to	  be	   a	   rudimentary	   way	   of	   compensating	   for	   many	   applicants’	   lack	   of	  corroboration.	  	  It	  is	  one	  element	  of	  giving	  them	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt.	  	  	  	  	  In	  English	  law	  this	  has	  been	  explained	  very	  clearly,	  even	  if	  it	  such	  clarity	  has	  not	  always	   led	   to	   understanding	   (indeed	   the	   2013	  Home	  Affairs	   Select	   Committee	  report	  noted	  that	  guidance	  from	  the	  senior	  courts	  is	  regularly	  ignored	  by	  initial	  decision	  makers).95	  	  The	  main	  case	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  Karanakaran	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  
for	  the	  Home	  Department,	  in	  which	  Brooke	  LJ	  explained	  that	  decision	  makers	  will	  come	  across	  four	  types	  of	  evidence:	  ‘(1)	  evidence	  they	  are	  certain	  about;	  (2)	  evidence	  they	  think	  is	  probably	  true;	  (3)	   evidence	   to	   which	   they	   are	   willing	   to	   attach	   some	   credence,	   even	   if	   they	  could	  not	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  it	  is	  probably	  true;	  (4)	  evidence	  to	  which	  they	  are	  not	  willing	  to	  attach	  any	  credence	  at	  all.’96	  	  Brooke	  LJ	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  it	  was	  only	  the	  fourth	  category	  of	  evidence	  that	  did	  not	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   when	   considering	   whether	   the	   standard	   of	  proof	  had	  been	  met.	   	  This	  passage	  confirms	   that	   the	  decision	  maker	  must	   take	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  In	  the	  UK	  it	  has	  been	  transposed,	  with	  even	  further	  digression	  from	  the	  UNHCR	  Handbook,	  into	  Immigration	  Rule	  339L.	  94	  The	  Home	  Affairs	  Committee	  (n26)	  noted	  UNHCR’s	  observations	  to	  this	  effect	  in	  its	  2013	  report,	  at	  13.	  95	  Home	  Affairs	  Committee	  (n26),	  13.	  	  	  96	  Karanakaran	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Home	  Department	  [2000]	  EWCA	  Civ	  11,	  [2000]	  Imm	  AR	  271,	  [2000]	  INLR	  122,	  [2000]	  3	  All	  ER	  449,	  per	  Brooke	  LJ,	  [53].	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into	  account	  evidence,	   including	   the	  applicant’s	  unsupported	  statements,	  when	  considering	   future	   risk,	   even	   if	   they	   would	   not	   go	   so	   far	   as	   to	   say	   that	   it	   is	  probably	  true.	  	  The	   2013	  Home	  Affairs	   Select	   Committee	   report	  makes	   reference	   to	   this	   four-­‐point	   list,	  and	  explains	   its	  application	  correctly	  and	  succinctly	  as	  meaning	   that,	  ‘unless	  the	  evidence	  presented	  by	  the	  applicant	  is	  demonstrably	  false,	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  accepted.’97	  	  The	  2015	  UK	  guidance	   for	  decision	  makers	  no	   longer	  discusses	  this	  point	  at	  all.98	  	  It	   is	   important	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  credibility	   is	  confined	  to	  the	  narrow	  question	  of	  the	  admissibility	  of	  unsupported	   statements,	  because	  otherwise	   there	   can	  be	  a	  temptation	   to	   fish	   for	   negative	   credibility	   indicators	   even	   where	   they	   do	   not	  relate	  to	  the	  core	  of	   the	  claim.	   	  This	   is	  particularly	  troubling	   in	  the	  UK	  because	  primary	  legislation	  requires	  that,	  ‘In	  determining	  whether	  to	  believe	  a	  statement	  made	  by	  or	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  person	  who	  makes	  an	  asylum	  claim	  or	  a	  human	  rights	  claim’	   certain	   behaviours	   are	   automatically	   damaging	   to	   the	   applicant’s	  credibility.99	  	  These	  focus	  on	  the	  mode	  of	  arrival,	  such	  failing	  to	  claim	  asylum	  in	  s	  safe	   state	   en	   route,100	  and	   arrival	   in	   the	   UK	  without	   proper	   documentation.101	  	  This	   is	   a	   troubling	  development,102	  because	   these	   factors	  have	   little	   to	  do	  with	  whether,	  assessed	  on	  an	  individual	  basis,	  the	  applicant’s	  testimony	  is	  believable.	  	  Moreover,	   recall	   that	   the	   2015	   UK	   guidance	   to	   decision-­‐makers	   couches	   the	  whole	   process	   of	   assessing	   the	   claim	   as	   being	   about	   credibility.	   	   If	   that	   broad	  understanding	   of	   credibility	   is	   employed,	   then	   the	   mode	   of	   arrival	   may	  inadvertently	   affect	   consideration	   not	   only	   of	   the	   applicant’s	   statements	   (as	  indicated	   in	   italicised	   part	   of	   the	   statute	   quoted	   above)	   but	   also	   the	  merits	   of	  their	  substantive	  claim	  of	  a	  well-­‐founded	  fear	  (or	  real	  risk	  of	  serious	  harm).	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  	  This	   brief	   discussion	   has	   sought	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   scale	   of	   the	   problem	   in	  relation	   to	   credibility	   assessment;	   and	   to	   clarify	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  ‘benefit	   of	   the	  doubt’	   and	   credibility,	  with	   the	  purpose	  of	   trying	   to	  disentangle	  the	   common	   usage	   of	   those	   terms	   from	   their	   potential	   legal	   effect.	   	   We	   saw	  above,	  by	  way	  of	  introduction,	  the	  UK	  Home	  Secretary’s	  scepticism	  of	  those	  who	  might	  seek	  international	  protection	  from	  Syria	  (to	  the	  extent	  of	  denying	  that	  they	  are	  the	  largest	  single	  group	  of	  people	  attempting	  to	  cross	  the	  Mediterranean;	  and	  branding	  the	  remainder	  as	  ‘economic	  migrants’).	  	  Against	  this	  culture	  of	  disbelief	  we	  must	   foreground	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   doubt,	   and	   apply	   the	   law	  on	   credibility	  appropriately.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Home	  Affairs	  Committee	  (n26),	  13.	  98	  The	  Karanakaran	  case	  is	  mentioned	  briefly	  on	  p12,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  attempt	  to	  summarise	  its	  key	  points	  (Home	  Office	  guidance,	  9th	  edn.	  (n35)).	  99	  Section	  8(1)	  Asylum	  and	  Immigration	  (Treatment	  of	  Claimants,	  etc)	  Act	  2004	  (emphasis	  added).	  100	  Section	  8(4)	  Asylum	  and	  Immigration	  (Treatment	  of	  Claimants,	  etc)	  Act	  2004	  101	  Section	  8(3)(a)	  Asylum	  and	  Immigration	  (Treatment	  of	  Claimants,	  etc)	  Act	  2004	  102	  See	  Hathaway	  and	  Foster	  (n37),	  150	  et	  seq,	  especially	  at	  p152;	  see	  also	  Sweeney,	  ‘Credibility,	  proof	  and	  refugee	  law’	  (n22),	  716.	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The	   term	   ‘benefit	   of	   the	  doubt’	   is	   not	   in	   and	  of	   itself	   a	   legal	   concept	   (on	   this	   I	  agree	   with	   the	   UK’s	   Upper	   Tribunal).	   	   However,	   it	   masks	   two	   very	   important	  points	   that	   do	   carry	   legal	   weight:	   that	   there	   is	   national	   and	   EU	   law,	   and	  significant	   international	   guidance,	   on	   the	   admissibility	   of	   an	   applicant’s	  unsupported	  statements;	  and	  that	  the	  overall	  standard	  of	  proof	  in	  international	  protection	   cases	   is	   low.	   	   If	   these	   points	   are	   not	   sufficiently	   distinguished	   or	  adequately	  addressed,	  then	  in	  particular	  cases	  there	  could	  be	  an	  error	  of	  law.	  	  	  	  ‘Credibility’	   is	   likewise	  prone	  to	  two	  common	  usages.	   	   It	  may,	   incorrectly	  in	  my	  view,	  be	  used	  broadly	  as	   shorthand	   for	   the	   strength	  of	   the	  case	  as	  whole.	   	  Not	  only	   is	   this	   legally	   imprecise,	   but	   also	   it	   may	   lead	   to	   the	   amplification	   of	  credibility	   factors	   from	   matters	   of	   evidential	   admissibility	   into	   questions	   of	  proof.	  	  It	  may	  also	  result	  in	  the	  enquiry	  beginning	  with	  the	  general	  credibility	  of	  the	   applicant	   rather	   than	   the	   facts	   on	   record	   (in	   the	  UK	   the	  AI(ToC)A	   2004	   is	  particularly	  awkward	  in	  this	  respect).	   	  The	  second,	  narrower,	  understanding	  of	  credibility	  overlaps	  with	  one	  dimension	  of	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt,	  and	  sees	  it	  as	  confined	   to	   the	   admissibility	   of	   the	   applicant’s	   unsupported	   statements,	  which	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  balance	  towards	  satisfying	  the	  low	  standard	  of	   proof	   as	   long	   as	   they	   are	   ‘credible’	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   not	   being	   demonstrably	  false.	  
